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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN M. STILLING, : 
Petitioner/Appellee, : Case No. 950818-CA 
V. : 
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND : Priority No. 3 
PAROLE; 0. LANE McCOTTER, 
Executive Director, Utah 
Department of Corrections; 
and the STATE OF UTAH, : 
Re spondent s/Appe11ant s. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Respondents-Appellants, through their attorney, Norman E. 
Plate, Assistant Attorney General, submit the following reply to 
the brief on appeal of petitioner-appellee Steven M. Stilling. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In his brief on appeal, Stilling asserts that the district 
court correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and -6 
(1995) to avoid conflict with the state and federal 
constitutions. However, his argument fails because (1) it 
erroneously assumes that the statutes in question are ambiguous, 
(2) it is contrary to the plain language of those sections, and 
(3) it erroneously assumes that defendants' interpretation would 
yield an unconstitutional result. 
ARGUMENT 
The district court interpreted sections 77-27-5 and -6 as 
authorizing the Board of Pardons (the Board) to order restitution 
in only two limited contexts, (1) when restitution was imposed by 
the trial court as part of the underlying sentence and (2) when 
the State, the Department of Corrections, or any other State 
agency incur costs "that arise due to the petitioner's needs or 
conduct." On appeal, Stilling asserts that this interpretation 
of these sections must be upheld because it avoids constitutional 
conflicts. However, this argument is faulty for three reasons. 
First, Stilling7s argument assumes that sections 77-27-5 and 
-6 are ambiguous. While Stilling correctly states that statutes 
should be interpreted to avoid constitutional conflicts, see 
Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990), this 
approach assumes that the statute in question is ambiguous and 
therefore subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. 
It is well settled that if a statute is plain and unambiguous, it 
may not be interpreted to create an ambiguity. Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). Because the statutes 
in question here are unambiguous, they cannot be interpreted to 
create ambiguity even in the name of avoiding constitutional 
conflicts. 
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Second, Stilling's interpretation of sections 77-27-5 and -6 
is contrary to the plain language of those sections. Because a 
statute should be construed according to its plain language, 
Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 896 P.2d 632, 633 (Utah 
1995), it is improper to interpret sections 77-27-5 and -6 as 
limiting the Board's authority to order restitution to the narrow 
instances proposed by Stilling in light of the plain language of 
those sections. See Aplt. Brief at 5-10. Moreover, because his 
reading of the statutes would effectively render portions of them 
meaningless and void, such interpretation cannot stand. See 
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995); accord 
Ferro v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 513 (Utah App. 
1992). Accordingly, Stilling's interpretation of sections 
77-27-5 and -6 as prohibiting the Board from ordering restitution 
in this case is clearly contrary to the plain language contained 
therein and is, therefore, incorrect as a matter of law. 
Third, Stilling's argument that the district court's 
interpretation of sections 77-27-5 and -6 must be upheld to avoid 
constitutional conflicts assumes that the interpretation proposed 
by the defendants is unconstitutional. This is simply not the 
case. When faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute, 
this Court "afford[s] the statute every presumption of validity, 
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so long as there is a reasonable basis upon which both provisions 
of the statute and the mandate of the constitution may be 
reconciled." Timpanoaos Planning & Water Management Agency v. 
Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist.. 690 P.2d 562, 564 (Utah 
1984). Defendants' proposed interpretation of Article VII, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution as noncomprehensive, see 
Aplt. Brief at 16-21, allows this Court to interpret sections 
77-27-5 and -6 according to their plain language without 
rendering them unconstitutional. In light of the general 
enabling language of article VII, section 12 that u[t]he Board of 
Pardons . . . may grant parole . . . subject to regulations 
provided by statute," Utah Const, art VII, § 12, that section 
should be read in conjunction sections 77-27-5 and -6 to allow 
the Board to exercise its constitutional power to grant parole 
subject to the regulations provided in sections 77-27-5 and -6. 
Stilling additionally argues on appeal that section 77-27-5 
and -6 violate the Utah Constitution's separation of powers and 
double jeopardy clauses. Although these grounds were not relied 
upon by the district court as a basis for its decision, even if 
this Court chooses to address these arguments on appeal, they do 
not aid Stilling's cause. While it is true under Salt Lake City 
v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), that the legislature cannot 
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delegate core judicial functions to another branch of government, 
that is not at issue here. What is at issue is the Board's 
authority to determine the appropriate conditions of parole for a 
particular inmate, which clearly is within its constitutionally 
delegated powers. 
Nor does the imposition of restitution as a condition of 
parole offend the double jeopardy clause of the Utah Constitution 
for two reasons. First, parole proceedings are civil in nature. 
See, e.g., Petersen v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 1154 
(Utah 1995); Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986); 
see generally Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). 
Since double jeopardy principles only apply to subsequent 
criminal proceedings, see, e.g. In re McCune. 717 P.2d 701, 707 
(1986), these principles simply have no application to the 
present situation. Second, the Utah Supreme Court has 
specifically stated that double jeopardy guarantees are not 
violated "when a defendant is convicted of criminal charges and 
those same facts are used as grounds for revoking the defendant's 
parole." Johns. 717 P.2d at 1337 (citing State v. Bullock. 589 
P.2d 777 (Utah 1979)). Similarly, since parole grant proceedings 
are not criminal in nature, the imposition of restitution as a 
condition of parole as a result of such a civil hearing also 
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cannot be viewed as the imposition of a second punishment for the 
underlying crime. Conditions of parole are merely that, 
conditions of parole. They do not purport to be, nor are they, 
punishment for the underlying offense. Instead, they are simply 
the prerequisites to a prisoner receiving the benefit of not 
having to serve his or her entire sentence. Accordingly, 
jeopardy does not attach in a civil parole hearing, and the 
imposition of restitution as a condition of parole does not 
violate Stilling's double jeopardy rights. 
Lastly, although Stilling does not expressly challenge 
defendants' argument on appeal that the district court erred in 
determining that the Board's assessment of restitution as a 
condition of Stilling's parole violated the Utah Constitution's 
prohibition against ex post facto laws, he does cite to Smith v. 
Cook. 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990), for the proposition that 
application of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and -6 (1995) to him 
would amount to retroactive application of those sections because 
he was originally sentenced prior to the time at which those 
sections were amended. However, assessment of restitution under 
those sections as a condition of parole does not increase 
Stillingfs punishment. As always, his sentence is three 
one-to-fifteen year terms, and Stilling had the option to reject 
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the conditions of parole and serve out the remainder of his 
sentence. Mansell v. Turner. 14 Utah 2d 352, 353, 384 P.2d 394, 
395 (Utah 1963). As noted above, the imposition of restitution 
as a condition of parole is simply that, a condition to Stilling 
being permitted the privilege of parole. Thus, no violation of 
the ex post facto clause of the Utah Constitution has occurred. 
See State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d 276, 278 n.3 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
In his brief on appeal, Stilling argues in order to avoid 
conflict with the state and federal constitutions, this Court 
must adopt the district court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 77-27-5 and -6 (1995) as limiting the Board's authority to 
order restitution to two limited contexts, (1) when restitution 
was imposed by the trial court as part of the underlying sentence 
and (2) when the State, the Department of Corrections, or any 
other State agency incur costs "that arise due to the 
petitioner's needs or conduct." However, such interpretation 
erroneously assumes that the statutes at issue are ambiguous and 
is contrary to the plain language of those sections. Moreover, 
the defendants' interpretation of these statutes, based on the 
plain language contained therein, yields a constitutional result. 
Thus, defendants ask this Court to reject the district court's 
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interpretation of sections 77-27-5 and -6, as well as its 
determination that those sections violated the Utah 
Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws and remand 
this matter for appropriate further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this olio day of April, 1996. 
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